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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explores the integration of emerging countries into the global system of 
innovation, as a channel for their technological catch-up. Using data on the innovative 
activity in the Chinese pharmaceutical industry, we analyze the geographic dispersion of 
inventor networks linked to China, as a function of the characteristics of the innovative actors 
that coordinate their inventive work.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Emerging countries local systems of innovation are increasingly developing. Although in 
recent years scholars have shown renewed interest in the technological advancement of 
emerging economies (e.g. Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Hobday, 2010; Kumaraswamy, et 
al. 2012; Lorenzen and Mudambi, 2013), the catch-up process that allows these contexts to 
upgrade their capabilities is not yet fully understood. This study aims at shedding light on this 
subject by studying innovation in the Chinese pharmaceutical industry. More specifically, we 
look at the international connectivity (Lorenzen and Mudambi, 2013) of Chinese inventors in 
this sector, defined as the extent to which Chinese inventors collaborate with peers located in 
foreign countries. Assuming that knowledge flows more effectively through direct interaction 
and personal contacts (Saxenian, 1994), emerging country inventors collaborating with 
international teams should act as a channel for the acquisition of advanced technology and 
knowledge creation practices, thus ultimately fostering the development of superior 
innovation capabilities.  
Inventors’ scientific work is usually coordinated by organizations such as private companies, 
state-owned firms, universities and research labs, originating from both local (Chinese) and 
foreign geographic contexts. Because organizations differ in terms of their objectives and 
incentives, their willingness to foster the international connectivity of their research teams 
can vary. In order to explore this phenomenon, in this study we ask the following research 
question: How do the geographic origin and institutional type of innovative actors affect the 
international connectivity of inventor networks in the Chinese pharmaceutical industry? 
To answer this question, we collected the population of pharmaceutical patents issued by the 
USPTO between 1975 and 2010 and granted to both Chinese and foreign assignees utilizing 
the scientific work of Chinese inventors. We analyze the geographic dispersion of the 
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inventor networks and classified patent assignees based on their geographic origin, as well as 
on a comprehensive taxonomy of assignee types.  
 
2. KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS AND INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIVITY  
The concept of connectivity is rooted in the idea of linkages. Linkages can be defined as 
channels that allow for the exchange of different types of resources (Lorenzen and Mudambi, 
2013). Because technological advances have fostered the disaggregation of value chains into 
specialized activities (Mudambi and Venzin, 2010), linkages have become increasingly 
global over time. This has generated prominent opportunities to participate to global value 
chains for emerging countries (Meyer et al., 2011). Entering global value chains helps 
emerging economies to get “closer” to the developed world. On one hand, emerging country 
actors become more familiar with the context of advanced economies, and may more easily 
consider investing in these locations in order to gain access to cutting-edge technologies and 
business practices. On the other hand, developed world organizations increasingly recognize 
the role that emerging countries play in the international organization of economic activities, 
thereby seeking to exploit potential business opportunities related to these contexts. These bi-
directional mechanisms generate higher awareness and mutual interdependence, which in 
turn reinforce the process of interaction and linkages creation between emerging countries 
and the rest of world. This dynamic is crucial for the catch-up process of emerging countries, 
as linkages frequently carry knowledge. Knowledge plays a critical role in countries’ 
innovativeness and economic growth, but it is often difficult to acquire from a distance 
(Singh, 2005), because its diffusion process tends to be geographically localized (Jaffe et al., 
1993). However, literature shows that the complexity of knowledge acquisition can be 
overcome through personal interaction between those who are willing to learn and those who 
have generated or master the knowledge to be transmitted (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001). 
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Geographically dispersed inventor networks, through which scientist from different countries 
interact and share pieces of their own knowledge, may thus offset distances and foster the 
effective transmission of technology, thereby allowing Chinese inventors to learn and 
ultimately catch-up. 
 
3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
3.1 Geographic origin: Chinese vs. foreign institutions 
In the context of the Chinese pharmaceutical industry, the dynamics of interaction and mutual 
recognition involving local and foreign actors have been particularly evident, thereby giving 
rise to an increasing number of collaborations, business opportunities as well as to a relevant 
flow of inward and outward investment. This has fostered the development of knowledge 
linkages with innovative actors located abroad, thus connecting the country to the rest of the 
world. On the whole, it appears that there are two drivers of connectivity: local innovative 
actors reaching out, and foreign innovative actors reaching in. Local innovative actors are 
Chinese-based organizations that are able to reach out and develop connections with foreign 
inventors, in order to use their scientific work to innovate. This can be obtained, for instance, 
by means of knowledge-intensive FDI in advanced countries (Piscitello et al. 2014). Many 
Chinese pharmaceutical companies are increasingly investing overseas not only for seeking 
knowledge and technology, but also for building brand awareness and global legitimacy in 
order to increase their market share and compete more effectively with advanced MNEs 
(KPMG, 2011). Although obtaining drug certification from the European or US market is a 
major challenge, Chinese companies strive to achieve this objective as it also encompasses a 
series of positive outcomes on both the home-market and other foreign markets, such as 
promoting reputation and brand image as signaling drug quality. Knowledge-based FDI helps 
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emerging country organizations to develop collaborations with local investors, thus accessing 
to diverse pools of knowledge.  
The second source of connectivity is represented by foreign innovative actors. Foreign 
innovative actors are foreign-based institutions that reach in, and involve local inventors in 
the organization of their research activities. Typically, this happens through the offshoring of 
innovation and knowledge-intensive activities to emerging countries (Lewin et al., 2009). In 
the case of China, the Open Door Policy has of course played a role in the activation of a 
substantial flow of direct investment from advanced economies. Specifically, foreign 
organizations have by now realized the importance of being involved in the Chinese 
pharmaceutical industry, not only for the size of the market, but also in the light of its 
innovative potential. 
While both foreign and domestic innovative actors may drive connectivity, we are interested 
in understanding whether systematic differences in their ability to spawn geographically 
dispersed inventor networks exist. Because of the increased globalization of human capital 
(Florida, 2005), developed world actors are starting to face a global race for talent (The 
Economist, 2006), which drives them to source knowledge and high value-added resources 
worldwide, in order to exploit the best available opportunities and increase efficiency. Asian 
countries, such as China, offer a substantial pool of qualified workers and expertise at a 
competitive cost, to which firms from other countries are increasingly willing to access 
(Lewin et al., 2009). At least 80000 Chinese PhDs from Western institutions have return to 
China to work in industry or in academic institutions, positing China as a leader in the 
knowledge-intensive outsourcing industry (KPMG, 2011). Accordingly, an increasing 
number of Chinese drug companies are turning to contract research organizations (CROs), 
and their market is expected to growth annually by 33% (KPMG, 2011). Chinese CROs offer 
research services at significantly lower costs and are increasingly able to meet Western 
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standards (KPMG, 2011). Under these conditions, foreign organizations are likely to develop 
frequent linkages with Chinese inventors. Conversely, due to their liability of emergingness 
(Madhok and Keyhani, 2012), Chinese actors are likely to face barriers when attempting to 
connect to foreign inventors. In spite of the increasing international openness of the Chinese 
pharmaceutical industry, cultural, institutional and technological distances may hinder 
Chinese-based organizations’ ability to develop collaborations with foreign inventors thereby 
limiting the geographic dispersion of their inventor network. We therefore expect that:  
 
HP1. In emerging markets, domestic innovative actors spawn less internationally 
dispersed inventor networks than foreign innovative actors 
 
3.2 Institutional type of innovative actors 
The geographic origin of innovative actors is not the only variable that may influence the 
geographic dispersion of inventor networks. Organizations that involve in innovative 
activities are heterogeneous in terms of their institutional types. Since different types of 
institutions are driven by heterogeneous objectives, their incentive to stimulate the 
international collaboration of their research teams may vary. In order to explore this issue, we 
distinguish between MNEs, single-location firms and university and research centers, and 
elaborate on their ability to drive connectivity. More specifically, assuming MNEs as the 
benchmark to which comparing the other institution types, we develop hypotheses on 
universities and research centers and single-location firms. 
Compared to MNEs, universities and research centers are characterized by an “open” 
approach to science and technology (Balconi et al. 2004). While MNEs have a strong 
incentive to protect the outcomes of their innovation, as they represent a source of rents, 
inventors operating in universities and research centers pursue research with the goal of 
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advancing the knowledge frontier, and are often driven by their individual motivation. 
Moreover, the social and professional environment to which they belong stimulates their 
willingness to share the results of their innovative processes, as this increases their reputation. 
Universities and research centers are not interested in the commercialization of their ideas, as 
this falls beyond the scope of their activity. Therefore they have no need to keep them secret. 
It follows that the community of scientists tends to be highly connected in spite of geographic 
distance, which stimulates the collaboration among inventors located worldwide. 
Single-location firms have limited opportunities in terms of resource access. While MNEs 
have a network of subsidiaries established worldwide, and may therefore access to pools of 
localized knowledge and resources in different host-regions (Almeida and Phene, 2004), 
single-location firms can only acquire resources available in their own locality. Access to 
resource is not the only aspect on which single-location firms are constrained. Compared to 
MNEs, which can exploit firm-internal networks and develop substantial internal linkages 
(Alcacer and Zhao, 2012; Meyer et al., 2011), single plant firms tend to rely more on their 
local cluster for linkages creation, thus being isolated from international networks 
(Henderson, 2003). We therefore expect that: 
 
HP2a. Compared to MNEs, universities and research centers spawn more 
internationally dispersed inventor networks 
HP2b. Compared to other innovative actors, single location firms spawn less 
internationally dispersed inventor networks 
 
3.3 Combining the geographic origin and institutional type of innovative actors 
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In order to fully appreciate the impact of the geographic origin of innovative actors and their 
institutional type, it is important to consider these factors jointly. In fact, the effects predicted 
in HP2a and HP2b could behave differently in the case of domestic innovative actors. 
On one hand, in spite of the idea of the academic community as a small world characterized 
by high interconnectedness, not all actors belonging to this world are likely to be equally 
central or to share the same privileged position within the network (Newman, 2000; 2001). 
Compared to their foreign peers, universities and research centers from emerging countries 
are likely to be marginalized, peripheral components of the scientific community, thus being 
less able to connect to the global academic network. On the other hand, compared to foreign 
single location firms, those located in emerging countries tend to be endowed with a narrower 
capability base, which decreases their already low ability to connect to the rest of the world. 
The relative backwardness and peripheral position of their locality also plays a role in 
reducing the opportunities for the creation of knowledge linkages with partners from more 
technologically advanced regions. Compared to their foreign peers, they should therefore 
drive a lower degree of connectivity. Based on this reasoning, we expect that: 
 
HP3a. The higher connectivity of universities and research centers compared to 
MNEs is less accentuated in the case of domestic innovative actors than in the case of 
foreign innovative actors. 
HP3b. The lower connectivity of single location firms compared to MNEs is more 
accentuated in the case of domestic innovative actors than in the case of foreign 
innovative actors. 
 
4. THE EMPIRICAL SETTING 
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We test our hypotheses in the Chinese pharmaceutical industry. The industry is characterized 
by inefficiencies arising from the difficulty to exploit economies of scale. In fact, R&D and 
manufacturing activities are geographically distributed throughout the territory and scattered 
across several (especially domestic) manufacturers, which lack competences and financial 
resources. Most local manufactures are engaged in imitation and repetitive production of low 
value-added molecules. Although in 2009 the Chinese government has started to reorganize 
the industry by favoring the integration with foreign firms, compared to their local 
counterparts, domestic companies are still at a disadvantage (Yuanjia et al., 2007). 
 
5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Sample 
In order to study inventors’ collaborations and the relative geographical distribution, we 
employed patent data. Patent co-invertorship has been previously employed to study the 
collaboration patterns of inventors (e.g. Breschi and Lissoni, 2009; Cano-Kollman et al., 
2013; Ejermo and Karlsson, 2006). We decided to focus on United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) data considering that it represents the most reliable and used 
foreign patent office, so this should be the best way to capture collaboration of Chinese 
inventors with foreign inventors. The choice of the only use of USPTO data is also related to 
the well-known issues arising from the lack of consistent quality across national patent 
systems and homogeneity in approval procedures and time. Further, inventions patented in 
foreign patent offices are in general more valuable, especially in the case of USPTO 
(Archibugi and Coco, 2005).  
In order to build our sample, we selected all USPTO patents that: (1) have at least one 
Chinese inventor; (2) were granted between 1975 and 2010; (3) are representative of the 
pharmaceutical industry, referring to the Drug and Medical technological fields defined by 
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Hall et al., 2001
1
. USPTO design patents mentioning the technological class “Pharmaceutical 
Devices” (D24) were also included. The sample thus generated consists of 1251 patents. We 
excluded from the initial sample patents that were unassigned or assigned to individuals (255 
patents, 20.38% of the initial sample). Hence, our final sample accounts for 996 patents.  
For information about inventors (i.e. name and address), we complemented our dataset 
merging the disambiguated inventors and co-authorship data provided by the Harvard 
Dataverse database (Li et al., 2014), which contains information on the USPTO patents 
granted between 1975 and 2010.  
 
5.2 Variable definitions 
5.2.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable, Geo_disp, is the geographical dispersion of the network of inventors 
measured following the approach of Cano-Kollmann and colleagues (2013). The construction 
of Geo_disp is based on the Herfindahl index, also known as Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, 
which is commonly used in industrial organization to measure of concentration of an industry 
(e.g., Tallman and Li, 1996). Since we are interested in the dispersion (and not in the 
concentration) of the inventor network at patent level, the Geo_dispi for patent i is 
constructed as follows: 
𝐺𝑒𝑜_𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑖 =  1 − ∑(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑛/𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖)
2
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
 
                                                        
1 The Drug and Medical category as defined by Hall et al. (2001) includes four sub-categories: Drugs (sub-
category code 31); Surgery and Medical Instruments (32); Biotechnology (33); and Miscellaneous – Drugs 
and Medicine (39).  
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where 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑛 is the number of inventors of patent i located in country n (N is the total number 
of inventors’ locations mentioned in patent i), 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖 is the total number of inventors of patent 
i.  
As a result, we obtained a censored dependent variable, which takes the minimum value of 1 
when all inventors are located in the same country (i.e. China in our analysis), and an upper 
limit asymptotically approaching 1 as the inventors network becomes more dispersed across 
different countries.  
 
5.2.2 Independent variables 
In order to test our first hypothesis, we built the independent variable 
Domestic_innovative_actor, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the assignee is domestic, 
i.e. Chinese, and 0 otherwise
2
. Since we are interested in the home-country of the innovative 
actors included in our sample, if the assignee was an MNE’s foreign subsidiary, we built the 
variable using the location of its headquarters (Almeida and Phene, 2004; Phene and 
Almeida, 2008). In doing so, we used BvD Orbis and rely on the information on firms’ global 
ultimate owners.  
The second set of independent variables is related to the institutional type of the assignee. We 
distinguished between universities and research centers, MNEs and single-location firms. For 
each assignee mentioned in the patent document, we analyzed first the institutional typology, 
and then, in the case of firms, the ownership structure, using information from BvD Orbis 
and companies’ websites. We defined as MNE any firm that has at least one subsidiary 
located abroad; otherwise firms were categorized as single-location. The categorization of the 
assignee type is time variant
3
 in order to take into account changes in the firm ownership 
                                                        
2Our sample includes 12 patents co-assigned by a Chinese and one or more foreign institution. In these 
cases the variable Insider take the value of 1, because we applied an inclusive criterion as at least one of 
the assignees is domestic. 
3 We checked the status of each assignee in correspondence to the year of the patent application.  
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structure (e.g. merge and acquisitions), which are very frequent especially in the 
pharmaceutical industry. After the assignees’ categorization, for each patent we created three 
dummy variables: University, if the patent’s assignee is a university or a research center, 
MNE, in case the patent has been assigned to an MNE or one of its subsidiaries, and 
Single_location, otherwise. For the analysis we used MNE as the benchmark. In case of co-
assigned patents, we take into consideration the categories of all the co-assignees. For 
instance if a patent has been assigned to a university and an MNE, both University and MNE 
take the value of 1.  
 
5.2.3 Control variables 
In order to control for the possibility that the most innovative actors generate the most 
dispersed inventor network, we included a dummy variable, Leader, which takes the value of 
1 for assignees in the upper quartile of the global pharmaceutical industry in terms of patent 
production in the year previous to the patent application (t-1). We measured patent 
production as the natural logarithm of the cumulative number of USPTO pharmaceutical 
patents
4
 issued by each assignee in the period 1975 - t-1. Data come from Harvard Dataverse 
database (Li et al., 2014). If the company is part of a group or is the subsidiary of an MNE, 
we used the pharmaceutical patent stock of its global ultimate owner to calculate the variable. 
In case of co-assigned patent, Leader takes the value of 1, if at least one of the co-assignees is 
in the upper quartile.  
Innovative actors from wealthier countries may have more resources to spawn globally 
dispersed inventors network. To control for this effect, we included the variable GDP pp, 
measured as the average of the natural logarithm of GDP per capita of the countries of all the 
assignees the focal patent in year t-1. GDP per capita data was obtained from the World Bank 
                                                        
4 Defined as describes in Section 4.1. 
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database. If the company is an MNE’s foreign subsidiary, we used the GDP per capita of the 
country of the global ultimate owner.  
We also controlled for the number of inventors for each patent, as captured by the variable 
Team_size.  
Moreover, we introduced the variable Design, a dummy that takes the value of 1, if the patent 
is classified by the USPTO as a design patent, and 0 in case it is a utility patent. Relying on 
the USPTO definition, “[…] “utility patent” protects the way an article is used and works, 
while a “design patent” protects the way an article looks. The ornamental appearance for an 
article includes its shape/configuration or surface ornamentation applied to the article, or 
both” (http://www.uspto.gov/).  
We also accounted for the technological characteristics of patents. Pharma is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the first technological class of the focal patent is included in the 
pharmaceutical category, as defined in section 4.1; otherwise it takes the value of 0.  
Moreover, we built the variable Tech composition adapting the Cubbin-Leech index (Cubbin 
and Leech, 1983) to the case of the patents’ technological composition5. First we computed 
the Herfindal index of the patent technological concentration (H_tech), using the three digit 
technological classes to which the USPTO has assigned the patent: 
𝐻_𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖 =  ∑ (𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ_𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑚)
2
𝑀
𝑚=1
 
 
where Tech_classi,m is the percentage of the technological class m represented in patent i on 
the total number of technological classes mentioned in patent i (i.e. M). Tech_composition is 
defined as follows: 
𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 = 𝐹[(𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ_𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑙)/(𝐻_𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖 − 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ_𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖.𝑙
2)1/2] 
                                                        
5 For a different approach measuring the ownership concentration shares in a firm, see Mudambi and 
Nicosia (1998).  
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where F[.] is the standard normal distribution function and 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ_𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑙 is the percentage of 
the technological class most representative in patent i
6
. 
In order to measure the amount of knowledge sources used to generate the patented 
innovation, we introduce the variable Know_source, which was calculated as the natural 
logarithm of the count of the patents that were cited by the focal one.  
Since we pool patent data over a 30-year period characterized by strong regulatory turbulence 
in Chinese IP regime, we control for the years of the discontinuity adding 2 dummy variables 
in 2002 and 2005 (Year t for t = 2002, 2005). These years represent two main changes in the 
Chinese institutional and international landscape: the ratification by the Chinese government 
of WTO entry and full compliance with the requirements of the TRIPS agreement, 
respectively. 
 
5.3 Model and methodology 
Given that our dependent variable is censored, taking a minimum value of and an upper limit 
asymptotically approaching 1, we adopted a robust Tobit regression model, which allows 
controlling for heteroskedasticity of the sample. To facilitate the interpretation of the results, 
we standardized all the continuous predictor variables before entering them in the different 
regression models (Aikne and West, 1991).  
In order to test our fist hypothesis we started from the following basic equation model 1 
(Model 2): 
    
(1)             𝐺𝑒𝑜_𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝 
𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟_𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                           
 
                                                        
6 For patent with only one technological class, so with highest level of technological concentration, we 
proxy the limit case for which it is possible to calculate a compute value of Tech_composition, i.e, 
𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ_𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑙 = 90%. 
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where i=1,2, 3, …, 996 are the Chinese pharmaceutical patents included in our sample; 
Geo_disp is the dependent variable, which represents the geographical dispersion of the 
inventor team of patent i; Domestic_innovative_actor is the dummy variable taking the value 
of 1 if the assignee is domestic (i.e. Chinese); Controls are the control variables described 
above, and ε is the error term.  
To test our HP2a and HP2b, we employed equation model 2 (Model 3): 
 
(2)           𝐺𝑒𝑜_𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝 
𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟_𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
+ 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                                       
 
where we added to equation model 1 the dummy variables University and Single_location, 
which are equal to 1 if the assignee is a university or research center, or a single location 
firm, respectively.  
Finally, to test the third set of hypotheses (HP3a and HP3b), we interacted the dummy 
Domestic_innovative_actor with the variables University and Single_location, i.e. Model 4 
and 5. In order to isolate the two different interaction effects, we introduced the interactions 
in separated equations (equation model 3 and 4), as it is shown in the following: 
  
(3)           𝐺𝑒𝑜_𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝 
𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟_𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
+ 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
∗ 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟_𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
(3)           𝐺𝑒𝑜_𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝 
𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟_𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
+ 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
∗ 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟_𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
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Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations of the analyzed variables. The table 
shows that the control variable GDP pp is strongly correlated (-0.9355) with the independent 
variable Domestic_innovator_actor. The high correlation is due to the propensity of Chinese 
institutions to collaborate internationally with innovative actors located in high-income 
countries. Hence, in order to avoid multicollinearity issues, we decided to exclude the control 
variable from our models.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
6. RESULTS 
Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients of the robust Tobit models applied to the equation 
models described above. 
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
All models produced statistically significant results (LR chi
2
=285.92 and p<.0 in Model 1, 
LR chi
2
=703.93 and p<.0 in Model 2, LR chi
2
=727.38 and p<.0 in Model 3, LR chi
2
=728.18 
and p<.0 in Model 4, LR chi
2
=733.16 and p<.0 in Model 5).  
We employed Model 1 as baseline that includes all our controls. In order to test our HP1, we 
ran Model 2 and we found confirmation of our first hypothesis. As predicted, the dummy 
variable Domestic_innovative_actor exhibits a positive and significant coefficient (p<.001 
also in Model 3, 4 and 5), thus showing that domestic innovative actors spawn less 
internationally dispersed inventor networks compared to foreign innovative actors.  
In order to test our second set of hypotheses, we employed Model 3 which shows positive 
and significant coefficient (p<.001 in Model 3, 4 and 5) for the dummy variable University, 
and negative and significant loading (p<.1 in Model 3, p<.05 in Model 4, p<.01 in Model 5) 
for the dummy variable Single_location. These two results support our HP2a and HP2b. They 
suggest that compared to MNEs, universities and research centers establish more 
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internationally dispersed investor networks; on the contrary, single location firms present less 
internationally connected networks with respect to MNEs.   
As regards our H3a and H3b, Model 4 and 5 include, respectively, the interaction terms that 
reflect our theoretical argumentations, i.e. University*Domestic_innovative_actor and 
SinglelLocation*Domestic_innovative_actor. We calculated the marginal effects shown in Table 
3 and we also present a graphical analysis (Figure 1 and 2) as suggested by Hoetker (2007). 
In fact, in non-linear models, the relation of the interaction term with the dependent variable 
may be more or less pronounced at varying level of the interacted variables, and the overall 
effect only refers to the average values. Therefore, the probability of an outcome cannot be 
directly discerned from the variable’s coefficient (Hoetker, 2007). In our specific case, in 
Model 4 the coefficient of the interaction between University and Domestic_innovative_actor 
seems to be not statistically significant. On the other hand, the interaction between 
Single_location and Domestic_innovative_actors turns out to be significant (p<.05) in Model 
5. Therefore, we review the marginal effects of the interaction terms and the interaction plots 
in order to obtain a richer and more informative interpretation of the results.  
Table 3 exhibits that all the marginal effects are statistically significant (p<0.001), and they 
are positive only when the variable Domestic_innovative_actor is equal to 0, and negative 
otherwise. Further, Figures 1 and 2 show the different impact of Domestic_innovative_actor 
on the dependent variable Geo_disp when innovative actors are universities and research 
centers and single location firms, respectively. In both cases (universities and single location 
firms), the connectedness turns out to be higher when the innovative actors are foreign, and 
lower when they are domestic. These results provide support for our HP3a and HP3b. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
[Insert Figure 1 and 2 about here] 
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Of the control variables, Leaders and Team_size show a positive and significant effect 
(p<0.001) in all the tested models. This means that patents by innovation leader assignees are 
more connected than the ones by laggard innovative actors, because the former better 
leverage their ability to recombine knowledge that is diffused among different inventors. 
Further, and not surprisingly, we find that the larger the inventor team of a patent, the higher 
the connectedness, because it is higher the chance that one or more of the inventors is located 
in a different country. Also Know_sources is positively and significantly (p<.001 in Model 1, 
p<.1 in Model 2, 3 and 4, p,<0.5 in Model 5) associated with the dependent variable 
Geo_disp, meaning that patents that source more from previous innovations tend to be more 
globally connected. Conversely, the control variable Design presents a negative and 
significant effect (p<.05 in Model 1 and 2, p<.1 in Model 3, 4 and 5). This is in line with the 
finding of Cano-Kollmann and colleagues (2013), confirming that design patents tend to be 
less geographically dispersed compared to utility patents. Finally, the variable 
Tech_composition shows a negative coefficient, but it turns out to be significant only in 
Model 1 (p<.5). It suggests that the higher the concentration in a specific technological class, 
the lesser the international connectedness of the patent.  
 
7. LIMITATIONS 
The use of patent data comes with a series of well-known limitations (Alcacer and Gittelman 
2006). In the specific case of this paper, the choice of employing USPTO data may under-
estimate the connectivity of the Chinese innovation system, especially with other emerging 
countries. Yet, USPTO patents are likely to capture high quality Chinese innovation, rather 
than the questionable inventiveness of repeated patents granted by emerging markets’ local 
patent offices (Hu and Mathews, 2005). Moreover, because our focus is on the catch-up 
process of emerging economies, connectivity with other emerging markets, which by 
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definition have less to offer in terms of learning opportunities, is less relevant to the objective 
of our study. Finally, it is worth noting that pharmaceutical patents do not represent - per se - 
innovations of commercial value, given the several stages that the patented drug has to 
undergo before reaching the market. 
 
8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Big pharma perform different activities in different emerging markets, some of them being 
used only as sales platforms due to the fear of knowledge leakage. This paper explores the 
role of emerging markets as locations for innovative activities in the pharmaceutical industry. 
As demonstrated by the considerable flow of inward investment that has targeted the country 
in the last decade, China is a very attractive location for R&D to advanced economy. In fact, 
in spite of the relatively low standards of intellectual property protection, MNEs have learned 
to implement effective strategies to avoid the risks of knowledge spillovers, for instance 
through the creation of strong internal linkages among technologies (Zhao, 2006). We focus 
on the catch-up process of the Chinese innovative system in the pharmaceutical industry.  We 
argue that a key aspect of this process is integration into global value chains and the global 
innovative system. There are two drivers of integration into global innovation systems: 
foreign actors undertaking innovative activities in the local (Chinese) economy and domestic 
actors undertaking innovative activities in foreign (typically advanced economy) locations. 
We examine the extent of integration into the global innovation system by looking at 
knowledge networks that are linked to China, either through organizations or individual 
inventors. We find that, compared to domestic innovative actors, foreign innovative actors 
generate more globally dispersed knowledge networks involving Chinese inventors, thereby 
sustaining the integration of China into the global innovation system. Moreover, the 
institutional type of the innovative actor matters for the connectivity of emerging markets. In 
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fact, universities and research centers are responsible for the highest connectivity, while 
single location firms spawn less dispersed innovative networks. Finally, our results show that 
these latter effects vary with the geographic origin of innovative actors. 
It is interesting to note that we are able to replicate the findings of Balconi et al. (2004), that 
relate to an advanced economy (Italy), for an emerging economy. In other words, universities 
and research centers have more dispersed innovative networks than commercial 
organizations. These non-commercial organizations have even more widely dispersed 
innovative networks than foreign MNEs. 
This finding has important implications for the institutional audience. Since a greater 
dispersion can be traced to foreign universities and research centers, we suggest that 
attracting advanced economy universities and research centers is particularly valuable for 
emerging economy catch-up processes, even more important than attracting high knowledge 
FDI. It may also be the case that non-commercial actors are less sensitive to issues of 
knowledge spillovers than commercial actors like MNEs. 
We find that single location firms have less dispersed innovative networks and amongst these 
firms, domestic Chinese firms have particularly low connectedness. This suggests that in the 
emerging economy context, smaller local firms are less promising as sources of catch-up 
innovation.  This could be because such firms have lower absorptive capacity and tend to rely 
on their local cluster also for knowledge sourcing, given that are not able to develop 
knowledge linkages with the global innovative system. Thus, highly innovative international 
new ventures (INVs) may be mainly an advanced economy phenomenon. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the variables employed in the analysis 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) Geo_disp 1 
           
(2) Single_location -0.2519 1 
          
(3) University -0.0451 -0.4387 1 
         
(4) MNE 0.2743 -0.4908 -0.4313 1 
        
(5) Domestic_inn_actor -0.6602 0.1578 0.2598 -0.3452 1 
       
(6) Leader 0.4673 -0.4288 -0.0482 0.4989 -0.4623 1 
      
(7) GDP pp 0.6629 -0.1611 -0.275 0.3975 -0.9355 0.5152 1 
     
(8) Team_Size 0.1381 -0.1066 0.0723 0.1361 -0.0788 0.1322 0.0973 1 
    
(9) Design -0.1165 0.2157 -0.2313 -0.0284 0.0632 -0.1306 0.0057 -0.2206 1 
   
(10) Pharma -0.0497 0.161 -0.0984 -0.0291 0.0159 -0.0302 0.0065 0.0567 0.1696 1 
  
(11) Tech_composition -0.1046 0.0204 -0.0157 0.0043 0.0891 -0.0818 -0.0863 -0.1243 0.1564 0.042 1 
 
(12) Know_Sources 0.1212 0.0434 -0.2158 0.1873 -0.2015 0.0669 0.21 -0.0412 0.1495 -0.0205 0.0338 1 
 
Mean 0.204 0.37 0.361 0.334 0.456 0.327 8.902 3.885 0.0863 0.686 0.939 1.547 
 
Std. Dev. 0.236 0.483 0.481 0.472 0.498 0.469 1.716 3.099 0.281 0.464 0.075 1.134 
 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.206 1 0 0 0.673 0 
 
Max 0.82 1 1 1 1 1 11.135 31 1 1 1 6.196 
  N. Obs 996 996 996 996 996 996 996 996  996 996 996 996 
 
 25 
Table 2. Robust Tobit Regressions (dependent variable = Geo_disp) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Leader 0.428*** 0.150*** 0.112*** 0.105*** 0.100*** 
  (0.0307) (0.0256) (0.0282) (0.0292) (0.0286) 
Team_Size 0.0530*** 0.0413*** 0.0420*** 0.0436*** 0.0409*** 
  (0.0144) (0.0118) (0.0116) (0.0118) (0.0115) 
Design -0.118* -0.119* -0.0909† -0.0918† -0.0976† 
 (0.0597) (0.0511) (0.0517) (0.0513) (0.0507) 
Pharma -0.0381 -0.0415† -0.0283 -0.0271 -0.0271 
  (0.0308) (0.0251) (0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0248) 
Tech_composition -0.0292* -0.0119 -0.0144 -0.0143 -0.0146 
  (0.0142) (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0114) (0.0114) 
Know_Sources 0.0641*** 0.0141† 0.0217† 0.0215† 0.0230* 
  (0.0141) (0.0115) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0113) 
Domestic_inn_actor   -0.597*** -0.628*** -0.602*** -0.682*** 
    (0.0326) (0.0341) (0.0438) (0.0418) 
University     0.0978*** 0.111*** 0.107*** 
      (0.0284) (0.0319) (0.0285) 
Single_location     -0.0574† -0.0638* -0.0956** 
      (0.0306) (0.0314) (0.0343) 
University* Domestic_inn_actor    -0.0536  
    (0.0598)  
Single_location *Domestic_inn_actor     0.140* 
     (0.0576) 
 Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons -0.0902** 0.264*** 0.264*** 0.265*** 0.278*** 
  (0.0311) (0.0269) (0.0318) (0.0318) (0.0320) 
N 996 996 996 996 996 
LR chi
2
 285.92 703.93 727.38 728.18 733.16 
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R
2 
0.2127 0.5236 0.5411 0.5417 0.5454 
Note: Variables have been standardized. Standard errors in parentheses. 
†p,<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.   
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Table 3.Marginal effects of the interactions (Model 4 and 5) 
  Domestic_inn_actor=0 Domestic_inn_actor=1 
University 0.3902*** -0.3438*** 
  (0.0271) (0.0367) 
Single_location 0.2399*** -0.3423*** 
  (0.0276) (0.0416) 
†p,<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
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Figure 1. Interaction plot: University* Domestic_inn_actor (University=1) 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Interaction plot: Single_location *Domestic_inn_actor (Single_location=1) 
 
